except for each General to continue punching on his own front. We do not say that this course is negligible. Unquestionably, operations such as those undertaken on the Somme, or on the Carso, have some considerable effect in drawing in a part of the enemy's manoeuvre forces and in exhausting in rotation the troops that are put in to resist, but neither of these operations availed to save Roumania.

In modern war, it seems that the power of the defence, by fast-rate and fully-equipped troops, is so considerable that great attacks can be held up by armies inferior numerically.

Unquestionably, also, the enemy has shown very great powers of resistance on the defensive, and extraordinary skill in making the utmost out of, and improving, artificially, such natural defences as are offered by the terrain,

13. We suggest that the Allied Generals should be asked by this Political Conference, to consider some more thorough measures of co-operation and that the Governments should be prepared to give them their support.

14. To give any direct assistance to Russia, except by means of such material equipment as can be passed in through Archangel and Vladivostock, is, we fear, impossible.* The extent to which material assistance can, and ought to be given to Russia, having regard to the interests of the Allies as a whole, is the

What can we do for Russia ?

primary consideration to be examined at the forthcoming Conference in Russia. If the Russian Conference reports that, by increasing such equipment it is really possible in the year 1917 to put Russia in a position to exert an influence on the War commensurate with her numerical strength, then we

*** Every other gate had been closed by the enemy.**